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Dewey and Our Present Purposes
A Review of Dewey and Education
Eli Orner Kramer (Department of Philosophy of  
Culture, Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw)
Scholarship, by its strict attention to accepted 
methodologies, is superficially conservative of belief. 
But its tone of mind leans towards a fundamental 
negation. For scholars the reasonable topics in the 
world are penned in isolated regions, this subject- 
matter or that subject- matter. Your thorough- going 
scholar resents the airy speculation which connects 
his own patch of knowledge with that of his 
neighbor. He finds his fundamental concepts 
interpreted, twisted, modified. He has ceased to be 
king of his own castle, by reason of speculations of 
uncomfortable generality, violating the very grammar of his thoughts. 
(Whitehead, 1961, p. 108)
Alfred North Whitehead, a philosophical contemporary and admirer of Dewey, cut straight to the heart of why it is risky to ask historians of 
philosophy such as myself to review the speculative, reconstructive 
work of philosophers attempting to renew philosophical ideas of 
the past for our present purposes. That is to say, I, in my historical 
mode, turn blinders to a great deal of research (this is what 
Whitehead means by “a fundamental negation”) in order to pay 
close attention on a particular philosophical period. In my case, I 
am a specialist in the history of American philosophy, from the phi-
losophies of First Nation peoples and Puritan colonialists, to 
classical American pragmatism and Boston personal idealism. I 
recognize and accept that this scholastic attitude is a restriction on 
myself. I have a conservative adherence to the lifeworld and aims of 
Dewey in context of his own thought. Yet at the same time, as a 
good Deweyan, I believe all good history is 
present- oriented (genealogical). Further, a 
good Deweyan recognizes that philosophical 
reconstructions of history have a special 
license for creative reinterpretation in order to 
better engage and meet the needs of the 
present. Philosophers of education take this 
call most seriously; philosophy is and has to 
respond to the needs of people in their 
development (education) in concrete experi-
ence. I am thus often conflicted when 
approaching texts meant to engage a broad audience (beyond the 
narrow needs of the historical scholar), wanting fidelity of interpre-
tation on one hand while recognizing the need for new kinds of 
stories and reconstructions on the other.
Walter Feinberg, as a leading philosopher of education, is all 
too keenly aware of the need for a new “progressive education” 
movement that continues Dewey’s reconstructive work without 
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letting our adherence to past thought blind us from questioning 
and reinterpreting Dewey’s ideas for our present purposes. In his 
new book, Dewey and Education, Feinberg (2018) offers an 
important, clear, and concise proposition. He offers a new Dew-
eyan social imaginary for the present needs of educators, from 
teachers, students, and administrators, to community organizers 
and educational theorists. What understandably gets left by the 
wayside sometimes is close care and attention to Dewey’s full 
philosophical context. My task in this review then is to largely focus 
on the power of Feinberg’s reconstruction of Dewey for education 
today, and ways we might further advance it. At the same time, my 
second authorial voice will leave signposts on the wayside for those 
interested in thorough, nuanced, and careful attention to Dewey’s 
own views embedded within his own context.
Feinberg (2018) begins his story by accounting in the preface 
for his own engagement with Dewey. As an exemplary educational 
reformer committed to questions of political life and social justice, 
Feinberg has had a deep and sometimes critical relationship with 
Dewey. His doctoral dissertation, A Comparative Study of the Social 
Philosophies of John Dewey and Bernard Bosanquet, was concerned 
with the questions of “social pluralism” and “political legitimacy” 
(Feinberg, 2018, p. ix), a theme he has continued to explore 
throughout his career. In so doing, he has expanded an area where 
Dewey is often felt as lacking; how to include in one’s philosophy, 
and in particular one’s philosophy of education, more nuanced 
readings of how power often prohibitively limits certain people 
from being considered legitimate actors in democratic life. In the 
1970s, Feinberg did his own important historical work exploring 
the foundations of 20th- century liberal education (Feinberg, 1974) 
in order to better understand the successes and limits of liberal and 
progressive education for our present needs today.
The stars shined brightly on Feinberg when he went to acquire 
his graduate education at the philosophy department of Boston 
University (BU). Under personalists like Peter Bertocci, and 
Deweyans (his dissertation readers) like Marx Wartofsky and 
Kenneth Benne, Feinberg was introduced to two figures who 
would become important to him in his later work: Hegel and 
Dewey. Feinberg’s department had been greatly shaped by three 
generations of Boston personalism, though by the time he got 
there, the department had already pluralized its specialties. Boston 
personalism was not, as Feinberg put it, a movement that primarily 
“[g]rew out of the Methodist Church (Feinberg, 2018, p. xv) and 
was “concerned with the problem of evil” nor simply with explain-
ing “why a benevolent God allowed evil to exist” (Feinberg, 2018, 
p. xvii). Boston personalism is an American philosophical 
tradition as old as pragmatism that is quite Hegelian in  
nature, which shares a close methodological orientation with 
radical empiricism (their method was often referred to as “rational 
empiricism”). It was, in fact, a full philosophy, one that often 
included a theology, but was much larger than that. To provide my 
own (greatly simplified summary), personalists, including the 
Boston school, think that the area of life we spend the most 
attention and care on is the personal. From family, friends, and 
romantic relationships, when someone says, “This is personal to 
me,” they reveal what is of primary value in life. Given that the 
personal is what we value when we value, personalists think it is the 
place to start one’s philosophy and life practice, and it suggests 
something about the nature of the world we live in (though 
personalists disagree with each other on just what exactly it 
reveals). Boston personalism is unique for drawing on the same 
roots as pragmatism, including many of its founders attending the 
same “Metaphysical Club” discussions. Even in the case of its 
theology, Boston personalism was often quite peculiar. For 
example, in the case of E. S. Brightman (Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
mentor at BU), it included an account of God as in time and finite, 
but infinitely suffering and feeling alongside persons striving and 
struggling for a better world. Its long- standing relationship with 
pragmatism has been well explored and documented, with most of 
the latter’s major figures, excluding Dewey, identifying as personal-
ists (see Pihlström, 2004; Williams and Bengtsson, 2018). Pope 
John Paul II himself was part of a long- standing tradition of 
Catholic personalism and was in fact a well- regarded Max Scheler 
(another personalist) scholar. The fact that both Martin Luther 
King Jr. and John Paul II were personalists reveals in itself the full 
significance of a point Feinberg makes about his own graduate 
education: “In any event, it was clear that I was drawn to philoso-
phy in part because I believe that ideas mattered in practice, and so 
did a number of the BU Professors” (Feinberg, 2018, p. xvii). 
Feinberg was part of a department and broader institution with a 
long history of seeing philosophy (both personalist and pragma-
tist) as grounded and having a duty toward the concrete world of 
human personal affairs. These departments, as with the pragma-
tists at the University of Chicago and the naturalists at Columbia 
University, were critical in supporting and cultivating leaders like 
Feinberg. They gave them the opportunity to support philosophy 
as something that can “make a difference that makes a difference.” 
Feinberg, even more than he suggests, is the legacy of a generation 
of leaders in philosophy. As we shall see, his own views were largely 
shaped by the transition from this older generation of scholars to a 
younger one, putatively far more cynical about American political 
life and social action.
In giving his own account of Dewey in the context of the older 
“liberalisms” popular among philosophers such as his teachers at 
BU, and as developing in the 20th century, Feinberg notes that
. . . Dewey did not accept the Marxist view that violent revolution was 
the best way to achieve meaningful change, and his ideas on 
education can be read in part as a response to Marx’s idea that the 
proletariat through violent revolution would service as the agent of 
effective advancement.” (Feinberg, 2018, xiii)
Here we get the first of several important strategic reinterpreta-
tions. As Cornel West and other philosophers and historians have 
noted, Dewey never closely read, or really even properly skimmed, 
the works of Marx (West, 1989). Further, Dewey, up through the 
Pullman Strike in Chicago (1894) and World War I, had an 
ambivalent relationship with the role of violence. Jane Addams was 
one of many voices that shifted him in another direction. Never-
theless, in spirit, Feinberg points to something important: Dewey, 
as in contrast with many critical theorists today, largely rejected 
violence as an important ameliorative tool for cultural 
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advancement. Dewey is in this sense a conservative, and the 
Deweyan ameliorative spirit is deliberative, slow, and augmenta-
tive; he was also then not an optimist in the power of our reason 
and free will to augment culture quickly (at least most of the time) 
(see Vannatta, 2014). In further framing the liberalisms popular in 
Dewey’s (and his own) generations, Feinberg notes that Dewey, 
unlike the existentialists, never fully rejected “the basic assumption 
of the Enlightenment that human knowledge was limitless . . .” 
(Feinberg, 2018, p. xix). But as previously mentioned, Dewey’s 
melioristic, largely nonviolent approach to social change was 
grounded in his doubts about the limits of human reason. Perhaps 
it would be better said that Dewey preferred to highlight the 
capacity of humans to reconstruct richer democratic communities, 
an emphasis that at times Feinberg rightly castes doubt upon. The 
more important and general point Feinberg wants to make, and 
that the historian of philosophy in me ought to listen to, is that 
Dewey’s “optimism,” grounded in the social optimism of the 
American social imaginary in the early 20th century, is no longer 
tenable for us. I will come back to this point later; suffice to say it is 
important to note that Dewey described his philosophy as “amelio-
rative” and not optimistic for a reason, one grounded in his 
Hegelian antirationalist stand on the activity of reason. This stance 
shaped his view of the philosopher’s normative role in society.
Another point on which the historian of philosophy in me 
must respond to is on Louis Menand’s account of the origins of 
pragmatism as arising “partly as a response to the massive destruc-
tion brought about by the Civil War” (Feinberg, 2018, p. xxii), on 
which Feinberg relies. Although the statement itself is entirely 
credible, it is worth noting that Menand far over emphasizes the 
Civil War’s role in the formation of pragmatism. Menand’s work on 
the subject, The Metaphysical Club (Menand, 2002), has been 
thoroughly criticized in the classical American philosophy 
scholarship (see Auxier, 2006; Juffras, 2001). Thus, although 
Feinberg is right that the Civil War greatly shaped early American 
philosophers, it is by no means the primary force in its inception. 
Now, it is fair for Feinberg to generalize and place classical Ameri-
can pragmatism into a broader American narrative. But not 
surprisingly, historical nuances get abstracted, glossed over, or 
simply ignored. The inception of pragmatism in figures like C. S. 
Peirce had largely philosophical origins, ones that had meaningful 
implications for the post– Civil War world but that were not caused 
by the war itself. Again, I find however that Feinberg’s overall point 
is valid: America is neither politically nor philosophically in the 
mood of reconstruction as it was after the Civil War. Civic culture 
is constantly being undermined, and we are on the brink of 
ecological collapse. The mood is not one that can easily be identi-
fied with a “rebuilding” of social imaginary (at least not yet), which 
pragmatism utilized to its great advantage.
Despite my scholarly and sometimes pedantic quibbles, I 
think the book is timely and important. Feinberg offers a critical, 
nuanced, and approachable usage of Deweyan philosophy toward a 
“new progressive education” movement. As Dewey did in his 
Democracy and Education, Feinberg adeptly frames the very 
project of the book in his own description of the purpose of 
philosophy of education: “This is why, as I have suggested 
elsewhere, philosophy of education is first and foremost a street 
philosophy. It begins, as Dewey would note, with the felt needs and 
common concerns that develop out of the everyday experiences of 
people” (Feinberg, 2018, p. 2). Feinberg’s task in the book is to 
explore what ideas of Dewey’s might serve the common experi-
ences and concerns of people today, especially in terms of their 
own (educational) development. His chapter one, “Introduction,” 
outlines his project in the book: to offer a clear vision of Dewey’s 
philosophy, and educational theory and practice, selecting aspects 
of Dewey’s work and highlighting perceived weaknesses in the 
effectiveness of Dewey’s ideas for today, including, for example, as 
they participated in the 19th century’s naïve scientific, progressive 
optimism and blind loyalties. His work is a sort of philosophical 
and personal genealogy of where Deweyan progressive ideas and 
education have been and where they ought to go to serve as a 
“street philosophy.”
Feinberg expands on the origins of what might be called 
Dewey’s own “street philosophy” in chapter two, “Influences  
on Dewey and the Development of Pragmatism.” He starts the 
chapter by highlighting that
. . . Dewey was more than an armchair philosopher or a disconnected 
educational theorist, and he was much more than a pundit. He was, 
perhaps more than any of these, even before the term was coined, a 
public intellectual who took on the issues of his day, such as war, 
depression and immigration, addressing them in the popular media as 
well as in academic publications. He was a philosopher who was 
willing to get his hands dirty and enter into the fray of political and 
social debate. And get his hands dirty he surely did. (Feinberg, 2018, 
p. 15)
Feinberg is a good reader of Dewey’s philosophy, especially its 
Hegelian and Darwinian elements, and how Dewey reconstructed 
those philosophies for his own purposes (see, for example, 
Feinberg, 2018, pp. 19– 20). He also offers a clear and respectable 
account of James’s and Peirce’s influence on Dewey, though much 
more obviously could be said, especially about the influence of 
Peirce on Dewey’s later works.
The heart of the book can be found in chapter three, “Dewey’s 
Philosophy,” and chapter four, “Dewey on Education,” which are 
expertly written, showing the skill and sensitivity of a senior 
Dewey scholar. In “Dewey’s Philosophy,” Feinberg traces the 
all- too- often ignored but essential thread to understanding 
Dewey’s philosophy: “The idea of meaning links the disparate 
elements of his philosophy” (Feinberg, 2018, p. 39). Unlike most 
modern takes on Dewey, with tired arguments trying to bend and 
warp Dewey to fit the narrow needs of analytic epistemology, 
leading to endless and unhelpful arguments about Dewey’s theory 
of truth, Feinberg goes to what is at the heart of Dewey’s work 
(even his logic): the creation, development, and intensification of 
meaningful experiences for human creaturely life. “A major task  
of Dewey and other pragmatists is to understand how confusion 
turns to meaningful order, not only for infants, but for all of us. For 
Dewey, we understand the meaning of something, we see its 
connection to other things and to a human purpose” (Feinberg, 
2018, p. 40). This task includes not only reflecting on the human 
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ability to bring meaningful order to living in and with the world 
but teasing out what the human ability to coordinate meaning tells 
us about the nature of the world. Knowing the role of meaning as a 
part of nature undergirds Dewey’s most central work: “Dewey is 
most interested in the function of meaning in expanding the 
control and predictability of human experience and in enabling 
people to control the connection between an event and the 
enjoyment or suffering that follows from that event” (Feinberg, 
2018, p. 52). In other words, Dewey was interested in helping us 
find a receptive engagement with our natural environment so  
that we can learn how to live ever more meaningfully with and 
through it.
Throughout this chapter, Feinberg adroitly articulates for a 
broad audience some of the complex nuances of Dewey’s philoso-
phy. He leads us from Dewey’s use of radical empiricism and 
theory of conceptual formation, to his ecological standpoint and 
moral theory. He also explores how Dewey might be compared  
to modern theorists, from Chomsky to Rawls. That said, I again 
must mention a quibble. It is a shame that Feinberg does not 
reference Dewey’s 1932 Ethics (Dewey, 1987) in his section on 
Dewey’s moral philosophy, as I believe it best speaks to the kinds of 
criticisms Feinberg gives of his ethics, such as that Dewey commits 
a mild version of the naturalistic fallacy1 (Feinberg, 2018, p. 61). 
Again, despite my small protestations, Feinberg’s overall point still 
stands its ground: that Dewey’s progressivist narrative of social 
progress does not well fit our own social imaginary (Feinberg, 
2018, p. 69).
In chapter four, “Dewey on Education,” besides going over 
Dewey’s normative view of what the school ought to be for society 
in his time and running through a number of important Deweyan 
distinctions between education and schooling, Feinberg contextu-
alizes Dewey within not only the progressive education movement 
but the state of education at the time Dewey wrote his work. He 
reminds us that Dewey started writing about education before it 
was compulsory in all U.S. states and as it was just beginning to 
adjust to the industrial age. In a time when more and more 
Americans moved from rurally rooted communities or immi-
grated from Europe, East Asia, and elsewhere to uprooted Ameri-
can city life, Dewey thought the school had a special contextual 
role to play. For “Dewey feared too that without an educational 
transformation, children would not develop a meaningful connec-
tion to a larger community, and that subject matter taught just for 
its own sake without regard to their real- life function would be too 
abstract to be meaningful” (Feinberg, 2018, p. 75). The role of the 
school was, in an industrial society, to provide the soil for mean-
ingful growth, a role once played by largely agrarian community 
settings and now that could be catalyzed by the opportunity for 
conjoint communication across difference in diverse city life. The 
school was to be a site for meaning making by and through our 
1 One might also look at Dewey’s criticism of the naturalistic fallacy 
(and why he moved beyond it) in Democracy and Education (Dewey, 
2008a, pp. 97– 99) where he surveyed the 19th century’s turn to natural-
ism (Dewey, 2008a). For a thorough defense of Deweyan moral philoso-
phy see Pappas, 2008.
differences. It would be a site for the transformation of education, 
society, and culture at large. Feinberg fairly points out that 
although we still have warrant to see the school as a site of social 
change, there is now ever more reason to question whether it can 
be the central source for much needed cultural transformation. 
Feinberg then takes us through a good review of what primary 
schools were like in Dewey’s day, and what Dewey’s Laboratory 
School at the University of Chicago aimed to do in light of that 
situation.
In order to illuminate how Dewey’s educational theory was 
meant to work in the new school as “social center” of industrial 
society, Feinberg offers a variety of helpful examples, from personal 
stories in the classroom and of learning to ski, to reflecting on the 
movie Hidden Figures. Through such examples, he carefully covers 
important nuances in Dewey’s approach to education. For 
example:
Once in the 1980s when I was doing research in Japan, I visited an 
English class in a high- pressure Japanese cram school that helps 
students pass the entrance examination for a high- prestige university. 
The class had about 300 students, all men, each one sitting in a neat 
row with the teacher, almost invisible, behind a high podium in the 
front of the room. Most all of the class was conducted in Japanese, 
except for a few English phrases that the instructor muttered once in a 
while, for example: “Step in the bus”; “step out of the car.” I doubt 
whether the students were learning more than a technical 
understanding of arcane features of grammar. The contrast was a 
small class of a dozen or so women training to be lower- level 
secretaries or travel agents. Their classroom was nicely carpeted and 
cozy, and the students were all engaging in discussing in English an 
American novel. These students were not only learning English. There 
were also learning to appreciate it as a mode of expression and 
communication. (Feinberg, 2018, p. 86)
One of the nuances of Dewey’s approach to education that this 
example suggests is that the point of what is now called student- 
centered education for Dewey was not that students controlled 
curriculum and that the teacher had no expertise in guiding the 
subject matter in relation to student interest. Rather, it was meant 
to point out that “[t]he teacher needs to understand the logic of the 
subject, but not just from the point of view of the expert, but also 
from the logic and interest of the students” (Feinberg, 2018, p. 87). 
The point is not to pontificate on one’s expertise but for it to serve, 
as it did for the small classroom of women Feinberg visited (at least 
from what he could gather from such a cursory visit to a classroom 
culture he was not familiar with as an American), students’ lived 
engagement and development with the material. The teacher is 
centered on the growth of the students in finding the meaning of 
English as a mode of expression and communication for their lives, 
not on having the students amass linguistic information.
Despite these concrete examples, Feinberg does sometimes 
err toward overintellectualizing Dewey’s philosophy. In some of 
these cases, a closer reading of Dewey’s pragmatic forbearers 
would clarify some misconceptions. For example, Feinberg claims 
that “Dewey does not say a great deal about how doubt is devel-
oped except to note that it arises out of a problematic situation, but 
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it is unlikely that doubt just arises naturally. Problematic situations 
have to be recognized as problematic before doubt occurs” 
(Feinberg, 2018, p. 88). Dewey does try to substantiate and 
articulate how doubt works as a sign of a problematic situation, 
which arises naturally, in works as varied as Democracy and 
Education and Experience and Nature (Dewey, 1981, chs. 1– 2).
He also clearly drew on Peirce’s own account of doubt as in the 
Fixation of Belief (Peirce, 1877). As that work makes clear, doubt 
does, in fact, occur naturally all the time and without being fully 
recognized and utilized by our intelligence. I walk out the door, 
and I trip on the first step out of the house. I then take two steps 
forward to regain my balance. Now, I might be too busy to think 
about it and recognize it in a way that would avoid future tripping 
situations. I also might attribute it to the work of fate vying against 
me. After all, my horoscope said I would hurt myself today. I might 
in such a way fix (as in stabilize or put in place) the belief and arrest 
the doubt. For Peirce and Dewey, doubts are not merely cognitive 
recognition of a problem in such a way as to fix it. Yes, doubt does 
incite intellectual reaction, but I could fix my belief in all sorts of 
dogmatic ways in order to continue my passive habits of walking 
out the door. I could then continue to trip several times a week on 
that step.
Feinberg’s point is that for “. . . education to advance, satisfac-
tion must be destabilized to a certain extent. Here is where the 
teacher’s role as a bridge between the novice and the expert comes 
into play. Part of the function of teaching is to destabilize satisfac-
tion by encouraging the student to explore the limitations of the 
practice that brings satisfaction (Feinberg, 2018, p. 88). A bigger 
implication is that we (Dewey included) are prone to miss prob-
lematic aspects of the world unless we challenge ourselves (and our 
students) to recognize them as real problems. We all too easily 
dismiss our doubts about uneasy topics, like cultural injustice, and 
let ourselves continue to be satisfied with our current practices. 
Systematic racism in the form of the U.S. prison industrial complex 
might not be recognized as a problem for those in privilege. Thus, it 
can go on being a problem only for minority communities 
entrapped by it, who really experience it, and not for others who 
can go about their daily affairs while being able to maintain all sorts 
of blinders to it and perhaps even reaping the rewards of the 
practice. But here is just the point for the pragmatist: We have all 
sorts of problematic situations that we fix with dogmatic judg-
ments, or have not responded to with our full intelligence in other 
ways, or that are not “live” events for us as we have not rubbed up 
against them in significant ways. The challenge is not simply to 
intellectually recognize a problematic situation but to help students 
“rub against” it as a real problem, and as the kind of problem that 
needs intelligence to arrest the doubt.
My point is to underscore the difference between having 
students talk about problems, let us say, bullying in school, versus 
having them as a community of inquiry feel it for themselves and 
then see if they can reduce it in their school. Here is where diversity 
is essential for the pragmatist. Without students with live experi-
ences of bullying and teaching other students how to be receptive 
to that experience as “live” and “real,” the experience has no 
opportunity to become of meaningful use to all. Diversity is 
essential for advancing knowledge, and that is just what Dewey 
hoped a diverse school would do for the previously homogenous 
communities of late- 19th- and early- 20th- century America. In 
such classrooms, students will not simply recognize but learn to 
experience a more distant problem from their lived experience as 
still live and real, and hit the resistance of experience when 
attempting to ameliorate it. They will hit what Peirce called the 
“secondness” of the world. The world as filled with troublesome 
facts. Just telling other kids bullying is bad is not enough for  
the world of fact: what kids do despite what their peers tell them. 
Here is a chance for intelligence. The trick is to support the 
students in not falling back on dogmatic ways to fix their  
beliefs. Here is where Feinberg is right on point: We do not just 
want to make students problem- solvers but intelligent/good 
problem- solvers.
Feinberg goes over many other important topics throughout 
the book, including Dewey’s conception of Democracy, challenges 
to it, and what we might take from it today. Overall, the same 
important larger problematic is repeated: Dewey’s social imaginary 
does not fit our age of distrust and does not dig deeply enough into 
the systematic problems that will get ignored by privileged 
democratic groups.
The book culminates in chapter five, “Toward a New Progres-
sive Educational Movement.” In his own reconstruction of Dewey’s 
philosophy, Feinberg “. . . suggests ways in which a renascent 
progressive education could contribute to the construction of 
those habits of mind and character . . .” (Feinberg, 2018,  
p. 103), which are, as he quotes from Dewey directly, “to aid in 
producing . . . the intellectual and moral patterns, that are some-
what near even with the actual movement of events” (Feinberg, 
2018, as quoted on p. 103). In other words, how can we use Dewey 
to initiate a new educational movement that can democratically 
reconstruct the present for a better future? For Feinberg, Dewey’s 
participation in a social imaginary of optimistic social progress, 
trust in American democratic national identity (and at least 
somewhat in the state), and faith in the ability of the school 
(broadly construed) to be the central force of social reconstruction, 
was always problematic, and is now no longer a “live option” for a 
revitalized progressive education movement. He also points to 
ongoing concerns with Dewey’s view of diversity and American 
homogenization and his inadequate attention to (and sometimes 
even silence on) questions of race, gender, and identity.
The vision we get is of an optimistic philosopher, with painful 
blinders given his privilege, who held a social imaginary that is no 
longer helpful for our needs. Since the 1960s, Feinberg believes we 
have moved from a social imaginary of optimism to one of 
suspicion. For Feinberg, this transition is no mere historical 
description— it is something he lived through as a young person 
and later as an academic committed to activism.
This was the real dividing point between Dewey’s generation and  
those that followed mine. I was in the middle, having internalized 
much that Dewey had also internalized— the promise of public 
education for a more inclusive, more democratic society, and yet I was 
also standing outside of Dewey’s generation and questioning much 
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that it took for granted— including the belief that schooling could 
achieve greater equality by itself. (Feinberg, 2018, p. 111)
To flesh out his point about what we need to leave behind in 
Dewey, in the middle of the chapter, he adeptly brings us to a piece 
of personal biography. This brief section is about his first reading, 
and his views today, on Dewey’s participation in the Polish Study, a 
study of the loyalty of a Polish community in Philadelphia to the 
U.S. during World War I (Feinberg, 2018, pp. 114– 115). Feinberg 
rightly criticizes Dewey’s misplaced trust in the American govern-
ment’s motivations for war and his participation in the study that 
put at risk this community of immigrants. It was not as if everyone 
was duped by the sinister elements of the war. Other more “suspi-
cious” pragmatists, like Dewey’s student Randolph Bourne, were 
critical of the war from the beginning and had it out with Dewey in 
public debates. Dewey, with full blinders on, supported a disas-
trous war. It is this kind of optimism (in line with an optimistic 
social imaginary of solidarity) that Feinberg thinks we can do 
without.
While Feinberg certainly thinks we should adopt Dewey’s 
approach to practicing philosophy of education, and his approach 
to the relationship between thought and action, Feinberg also 
thinks we should be more mindful and critical of the unjust 
behavior of society at large, all while being open to more confron-
tational and less academic, community- based responses to the 
problematic situations of social life. Further, Feinberg thinks we 
should have no illusions that the formal school can, by itself, be the 
site of social progress. The point is to reuse Dewey toward a 
broader and messier method of progressive education reform. This 
conclusion is entirely warranted and indeed is duly pragmatic. As 
Feinberg notes of his own work: “My criticism of Dewey is itself a 
part of the pragmatic tradition. It aims to bring together our 
deepest understanding of democracy, with the facts of social life as 
we experience them.” (Feinberg, 2018, pp. 120– 121)
But what then does this new progressive education movement 
look like?
A new progressive education would recognize structural and 
systematic inequality and promote more equitable distribution of 
power. The idea of a new progressive education has three interrelated 
dimensions. First it has a political dimension. Students would 
understand the ways in which benefits are developed and 
distributed in American Society. Second, it has a creative dimension. 
Students would develop the ethical and aesthetic capacity to imagine 
alternative realities. Third it has an academic dimension. Students 
would develop the scientific, communicative and the political skills 
that promote agency and fulfillment. (Feinberg, 2018, p. 120)
Feinberg questions whether we should even call this movement 
“progressive education” or if that term too needs to be let go of in 
the new reconstruction. In the last sections of the chapter, he offers 
a few varied examples of small steps we might take in this direc-
tion. He rightfully draws on the work of Meira Levinson as a model 
of how to address the civic empowerment gap and the kind of 
training and community- based projects that might build political 
skills and cultivate student agency. One also might think of the 
civic studies “public achievement” model as another example of the 
new progressive education movement Feinberg envisions. Public 
Achievement is an international civic education and empower-
ment initiative founded by Harry Boyte in which young people, 
faculty, community members, and parents work together on 
community problems and projects to “build the commonwealth” 
(see Boyte, 2018).
Although the examples are helpful, the reader is left with 
other lurking questions. Just how is this new progressive education 
to get off the ground, and what role does Dewey as theorist, public 
intellectual, and model play in that organizing effort? If we need to 
reconstruct Dewey’s praxis in order to build this movement, and 
even if, à la Whitehead, it makes us historians of philosophy 
uncomfortable, what should we draw upon?
I end with an anecdotal note. On good authority, a word- of- 
mouth insight has been handed down by several generations of 
Deweyans to me. It has been told that John Herman Randall said 
that Dewey exaggerated his optimism in his published work 
because he felt he had a duty to the public to put a hopeful face on 
things. This anecdote fits well with what Dewey said about the 
place of the melioristic attitude in philosophy:
After all, the optimism that says that the world is already the best 
possible of all worlds might be regarded as the most cynical of 
pessimisms. If this is the best possible, what would a world which was 
fundamentally bad be like? Meliorism is the belief that the specific 
conditions which exist at one moment, be they comparatively bad or 
comparatively good, in any event may be bettered. It encourages 
intelligence to study the positive means of good and the obstructions to 
their realization, and to put forth endeavor for the improvement of 
conditions. It arouses confidence and a reasonable hopefulness as 
optimism does not. For the latter in declaring that good is already 
realized in ultimate reality tends to make us gloss over the evils that 
concretely exist. It becomes too readily the creed of those who live  
at ease, in comfort, of those who have been successful in obtaining this 
world’s rewards. Too readily optimism makes the men who hold it 
callous and blind to the sufferings of the less fortunate, or ready to find 
the cause of troubles of others in their personal viciousness. It thus 
co- operates with pessimism, in spite of the extreme nominal 
differences between the two, in benumbing sympathetic insight and 
intelligent effort in reform. It beckons men away from the world of 
relativity and change into the calm of the absolute and eternal. 
(Dewey, 2008b, pp. 181– 182)
Perhaps Dewey was then not so caught up in an optimistic social 
imaginary as Feinberg would have us believe. Rather, he wanted to 
lure people to the “reasonably hopeful” through his own work as a 
philosopher, so they could empower themselves to harness the 
ameliorative potential in any situation. On this view, philosophy’s 
job is, even if it makes us suspicious sometimes, to incite us to 
address intelligently our most pressing problems. Feinberg’s work 
offers just such an incitation, one Dewey himself, I think, would be 
pleased with as reasonably hopeful. A new educational movement 
that addresses our present needs might learn from Dewey that the 
reasonably hopeful is needed to lure us toward the better. We can 
be thoughtfully suspicious, but we ought to also fortify ourselves in 
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our philosophies with the strength to change what we can change 
in our present situation.
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